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Abstract
It is generally thought that members in monetary union experience a similar
level of ination. This paper veries this conventional belief. Using regional
data, we present statistical evidence of heterogeneous ination in Japan. Not
only does the average ination di¤er signicantly across regions, but regional
ination responds di¤erently to common economic and monetary factors. Fur-
thermore, we show no evidence of price convergence in a group of entire regions
although there is some evidence of convergence in subgroups. These results
suggest that diversied regional ination can exist within monetary union.
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1 Introduction
Having similar levels of ination has often been argued as an important factor for
creating monetary union since only a single monetary policy can be implemented
for all regions in the union. Indeed, when forming the euro area in 1999, this
was one of the conditions that successful candidate countries had to meet, and
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was one means of safeguarding economic convergence.1
Although more than a decade has passed since then, the homogeneity of regional
ination is still actively analyzed by many researchers (e.g., Spiru 2007, Horvath
and Koprnicka 2008, MacDonald and Wojcik 2008, and Ohnsorge, Choueiri and
van Elkan 2008) since there is a queue of countries wishing to join the euro area.
The importance of research was also underscored when authorities in Asia discussed
the creation of a monetary union in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis as one
possible means of promoting regional nancial stability, and when the members of
the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed in 2001 to form a monetary union sometime
in the future.
However, less research has been conducted on those already in the union, possibly
reecting the widely held belief that regions/countries already in the same monetary
union experience a similar level of ination. Using Japanese regional data, this paper
examines if this general belief is appropriate. The ideal situation for monetary union
may indeed be that not only ination but everything (e.g., the culture, economic
system, laws, etc) is the same within the union.2 In this regard, Japanese regions
may be rather interesting for research since they are very homogenous in terms of
culture (language, race, religion, etc) due to geographical and historical reasons.3
Thus our general question would be whether Japanese regions meet the condi-
tions for monetary union. More specically, we focus on ination/price homogeneity
issues, and ask 1) if the level of ination is the same across regions, and 2) if regional
ination responds to common economic and monetary movements in a similar way.
The second question is essentially equivalent to the rst but from a di¤erent view-
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point. Furthermore, in the presence of heterogeneous ination, we ask 3) if regional
prices show any sign of convergence. The presence of price convergence will at least
give some relief to policymakers even if there is signicant heterogeneous ination
as such price discrepancies would be expected to cease in the future.
With respect to price convergence, there have been studies which looked for the
causes of discrepancies in Japanese regional prices.4 Thus their focus was often
on relative prices (the ratio of local prices to the benchmark, i.e., pit   pjt where
p is log price, and subscript i and t denote region and time and i 6= j) rather
than regional ination (i.e., pit   pit 1). Using panel unit root test methods, Esaka
(2003) studied Japanese relative prices using prefectural data and Tokyo as the
benchmark city, and found that local prices particularly in the tradable goods sector
tend to move with the benchmark over the long-run. Furthermore, some e¤orts were
made to explain short-term deviations in regional prices. For example, Baba (2008)
considered market imperfection by introducing a mark-up in the distribution sector
and found that this explains a small fraction of price deviations. Nagayasu and
Inakura (2009) showed that di¤erences in price levels can be explained by economic
factors such as wages and transaction costs.5
In short, we provide evidence of signicant discrepancies in regional ination
and no evidence of price convergence in Japan. The rst conclusion is supported
by a simple statistical test and a factor model in which we identify economic and
monetary factors which are common to all regions. The second conclusion of no price
convergence in a group consisting of all regions is found using the Phillips-Sul (2007)
approach which has some statistical advantages compared with the conventional
method such as panel unit root tests. (We shall explain this shortly.) However,
there is evidence of convergence in subgroups. Thus our results appear to be in
sharp contrast to the conventional belief of policymakers and researchers.
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2 Is Regional Ination the Same within a Mone-
tary Union?
We utilize quarterly data covering 10 regions in Japan; Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto,
Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa.6 Their price
data (the Consumer Price Index, CPI (2005=100)) are obtained from the Ministry
of Internal A¤airs and Communications and are available from 1975Q1 to 2005Q4.
Thus our data measure price trends for a comprehensive range of consumer goods
and are ones that policymakers closely monitor. Region-specic ination rates,
expressed as annual changes (%), are shown in Figure 1.
<Figure 1>
In addition to price data, there are additional variables used to explain the
common factor. They are money (M1 and M2, m), Gross National Income (GNI),
and interest rates (the call rate and the return on the Japan Government Bond with
10 year maturity, i). These variables are obtained from the International Financial
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, and they are chosen on the basis of
a variant of the standard money demand function.
pt = mt + it   gnit (1)
where t = 1; : : : ; T and  is a di¤erence operator. Greek letters measure the
sensitivity of the interest rate and real income (gni) to ination (p). All variables
except the interest rate are in log form, and the interest rate is expressed in terms
of annual percentage. Real income is calculated by deating the GNI by the CPI.
Their sign follows economic theory, and thus equation (1) states that ination is
positively associated with monetary variables and negatively with income. Since
these explanatory data are not region-specic, we consider them to a¤ect all regions
but allow for the possibility of a¤ecting regional ination with a di¤erent magni-
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tude. We focus largely on the common factors because of the availability of the
region-specic data, but some regional factors will be considered when attempting
to understand regional prices at the end of Section 4.7
The basic statistics of regional ination are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The rst
table shows that discrepancies may exist among regional ination within a country.
In particular, Okinawa has experienced lower ination than other regions on average.
Many regions experienced ination of around 2 percent, with the Okinawa region
about 1.6 percent. A similar result is also reported in the correlation matrix in Table
2. It shows that Okinawa exhibited a less close relationship with other regions. We
believe that this outcome is due partly to the fact that Okinawa is a relatively new
region, and thus development of its economic system still lags behind others.8 This
directs us to analyze the response of Japanese regional ination to the common
factor driven by changes in money, interest rates, and income.9
<Tables 1 and 2>
We formally examine the homogeneity of regional ination by statistical tests
and report the results in Table 3. This table shows that ination signicantly di¤ers
among regions, and also even though we exclude Okinawa which exhibited the lowest
ination, the result remains unchanged. Thus, it seems that there is signicant
heterogeneity in regional ination even though Japanese regions have been in the
same monetary union for a considerable time. A similar test for Japan, the UK
and US using ination calculated from annual (rather than quarterly) CPI data is
carried out in the appendix, and shows that this is a distinctive feature of Japan.10
<Table 3>
3 Asymmetric Responses of Regional Ination
Here, using a factor model, we analyze regional ination behaviors in response to
unobservable economic and monetary movements which are common to all regions.
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Previous research often used impulse response functions in order to track the re-
sponses to shocks in their time-series analysis. Since we use panel data and attempt
to nd unobservable common factors in the country, the factor model appears to
be an appropriate method. Furthermore, although this paper limits the number
of common factors in the system to one, we allow a di¤erent composition in the
factor.11
With N regions and one factor, a static factor model can be expressed in the
following observation and transition equations. The observation equation is:
p1 = a1f + v1
...
pN = aNf + vN
(2)
Or
X = AF + V (3)
whereX 0 = [p1; :::;pN ], F 0 = [f; :::; f ], V 0 = [v1; :::; vN ], andA0 = diag(a1; :::; aN).
The transition equation is:
f = Dz + u (4)
Equations (2) to (4) contain the time dimension (t = 1; : : : ; T ) such that for
example regional ination, p, is a (T  1) vector, and f is the (T  1) vector of an
unobservable state variable which is assumed common in all regions and is in turn a
function of exogenous variables, z. In order to take account of an endogeneity issue,
a common factor is assumed to be associated with the lagged value of economic and
monetary variables (z), which are in turn chosen on the basis of the standard money
demand function. Each region faces these common economic and monetary shocks
captured by f but such shocks may have a di¤erent impact on regional ination,
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which is reected in factor loadings, A. One can regard f as an economic factor when
real GDP is included and as a monetary factor when f consists of money and/or the
interest rate which are instruments for the central bank when conducting monetary
policy.
With respect to the residuals, V and u, follow a white noise process, and v repre-
sents an idiosyncratic component. For operational purposes, V and f are mutually
independent, normal, random variables and are diagonal matrices. For example,
var(vi) = 	i and thus
	 =
266664
	1    0
...
. . .
...
0    	N
377775
The assumption on V is one popular identication method, and these settings
imply that regional-specic events which are not captured by f are not correlated
with one another. Finally, the variates f and v are independently distributed. Then,
the covariance matrix can be expressed as:  = AA0 + 	 (see Anderson 1984).
Using this covariance matrix, the model can be estimated using the Kalman lter
approach which in turn relies on the maximum likelihood method. It is well known
that maximum likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal when
data are stationary. Thus, when they are nonstationary, the di¤use Kalman lter
approach (De Jong 1988) can be employed.
The results are presented in Tables 4 to 6 where a di¤erent specication of the
common factor is employed. In Table 4, the common factor is not meaningfully
dened, but it is positively and signicantly associated with ination in all regions.
The test for parameter equality (Chi2 test) suggests that regional ination responded
di¤erently to this common factor. These results seems robust to the specication of
f , which will be discussed next.
<Table 4>
In Tables 5 and 6, the common factor is specied as a function of particular eco-
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nomic and monetary variables. For instance, the common factor is assumed to be
related to money in Table 5. Our results suggest that money is positively associated
with ination which is consistent with economic theory, and furthermore the statis-
tical signicance level (in terms of t-values) increases when broad money (M2 (m2))
rather than narrow money (M1 (m1)) is used in the analysis.12 This is an expected
outcome since M2 captures economic activities more comprehensively and is highly
correlated with income at a macro-level. It should be also noted that Okinawa
is least responsive to the common factor. With this specication of the common
factor, we obtained evidence of the heterogeneous response of regional ination to
monetary variables as the null hypothesis of the equalization of all parameters for f
is rejected.
<Tables 5 and 6>
Table 6 species the common factor as a function of money, income (gni) growth,
and the call or Japanese government bond (jgb) rates. This long-term (10-year
maturity) bond rate is used to check the robustness of our previous ndings using
the call (short) rate which has stayed around 0 percent since the mid 1990s. Our
estimates from the call rate may have been biased potentially due to nonlinearity.
Since M2 is found to be more signicant than M1 in Table 5, this table shows only
the results from the former denition of money.13
Despite our concern however, the results from the jgb rate are similar to those
using the call rate. This table shows that consistent with economic theory (i.e.,
equation (1)), money and the call/jgb rates are found to be positively correlated
with ination although the latter is statistically insignicant. The former result
that regional ination increases along with an increase in money is congruous with
our result in Table 5. Furthermore, the common factor is found to be signicantly
and negatively associated with income growth. Similarly, the common factor (f)
enters positively and signicantly in each regional ination equation, and the null
hypothesis of the equalization of parameters for the common factor is statistically
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rejected. Thus as in the case of monetary shocks alone, our data seem to conrm the
importance of the common factor in regional ination and suggest the heterogeneous
response of regional ination to the common factor.
4 Convergence in Regional Prices
The presence of heterogeneous ination among Japanese regions is a surprising re-
sult, at least to us. We thus next investigate whether regional prices are converging
during our sample period. While regional ination may di¤er in Japan, there may be
signs of price convergence. This happens when low (high) price regions experience
high (low) ination. In that case, price convergence occurs and the heterogeneity in
ination becomes a less serious issue. Therefore, it is important to study regional
price behaviors as well as ination.
In this connection, we use the statistical test for convergence (known as the log
t test) proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007). Previous literature on price conver-
gence often utilizes the -convergence criterion originally proposed by Sala-i-Martin
(1996). The -convergence indicates that a region with a low initial price level
experiences higher ination in order to catch up with regions with a high initial
price level.14 Since the panel unit root test was often used in order to test the
-convergence (see Introduction), the use of the Phillips-Sul method departs from
most literature on price convergence.
We use the Phillips-Sul method since the unit root in the di¤erence in log price
across regions may not necessarily imply price divergence. Phillips and Sul discuss
that the unit root test leads to a conclusion of non-convergence among regions when
the common factor is non-stationary even if there is a sign of convergence in region-
specic factors.15 Thus in order to circumvent this problem, they provide a general
framework which is robust to the characteristics of the common factor.
More specically, the Phillips-Sul test analyzes the null hypothesis of conver-
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gence against the alternative of no convergence and/or partial convergence among
subgroups. As will become clear, unlike many studies using relative prices which
requires a benchmark price, the Pillips-Sul approach does not need to specify this
since the cross-sectional average among a group of regions automatically becomes
the benchmark, and this benchmark changes according to the composition of the
group.
Suppose that a panel data (Xit) can be decomposed into two elements.
Xit = itt (5)
where t is a common factor and it is a transition parameter. Subscripts i and
t represent regions (i = 1; : : : ; N) and time (t = 1; : : : ; T ) respectively. Phillips and
Sul consider the following slow varying function for it.
it = i + iitL(t)
 1t  for t  1 (6)
where i is xed elements specic to regions, it is iid(0; 1) across i and i > 0.
L(t) is a function of time with L(t) ! 1 as time ! 1, and is assumed to follow
log t following the recommendation of Phillips and Sul (2007). Thus it introduces
time-varying and region-specic components to the model. They show that the size
of  determines the behavior (i.e., converge or divergence) of it. When   0, it
converges to i and thus this becomes the basis for the statistical hypothesesH0:
i =  for all i and   0 and H1: i 6=  for all i and  < 0.
They show that these hypotheses can be statistically tested using the following
equation.
log

H1
Ht

  2 logL(t) = a+ b log t+ ut (7)
where Ht = 1N
PN
i=1(hit   1)2 and hit = XitN 1PNi=1Xit . Furthermore, Phillips and
Sul showed that b, the key parameter for the convergence test, is related with  and
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indeed b = 2.
Using these notations, the convergence or divergence of X is consistent with
that of log(H1=Ht). Under convergence, log(H1=Ht) diverges to 1 since Ht ! 0
as t ! 1 for given N . This happens when log t in equation (7)! 1 and  > 0
in equation (6), or when 2logL(t) ! 1 and  = 0. Thus, the concept of price
convergence is based on hit ! 1 for all i as t ! 1, and so we can study the
statistical hypotheses mentioned earlier by examining the size of b: the null of
convergence can be tested with b  0 and the alternative with b < 0. This is known
as relative convergence as it measures convergence to some cross-sectional average
as can be seen from the denition of Ht and hit, and is in contrast to the concept of
level convergence analyzed by Bernard and Durlauf (1996) and Evans and Karras
(1996).
When implementing the test, we initially create a subgroup (say, Subgroup A)
with k  2. In order for this, the panel data are organized by the order of price
levels in the nal year (i.e., 2005), and Subgroup A is created by including a region
with the highest price level. For operational purposes, Phillips and Sul proposed a
clustering algorithm for subgroup convergence in the panel data using the t statistics
used in the log t test (i.e., equation (7)). More specically, the log t test is carried
out for all combinations of subgroups which contain k (2  k < N) regions. Then
the optimal number of the subgroup is chosen using the following criterion and the
5 percent critical value for the one side test, i.e., condition (8).
k = arg max
k
ftkg subject to minftkg >  1:65 (8)
Non-rejection of log t test for k regions indicates price convergence within Sub-
group A. But that does not mean that there is no convergence among other regions
that do not form this rst subgroup unless k = N   1.16 Thus condition (8) is
examined in the panel consisting of other regions, and we continue this process until
there is evidence of no more convergence.
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For the analysis, the CPI (2005=100) used in the previous subsection cannot be
used since it does not take account of price discrepancies among regions. Thus, we
compiled the price data using the CPI and the index to measure the price di¤erences
between regions in 2005 which is also available from the National Statistics Center,
the Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications. Table 7 presents the price
level for each region with the country average equal to 100, and shows the highest
price in Kanto and the lowest in Okinawa. Furthermore, the compiled data are
shown in Figure 2.
<Table 7 and Figure 2>
The results on the convergence tests are shown in Table 8 where both parameter
b and its t value are reported in this table.17 In order to check the robustness of our
ndings, we also report here results from annual data. Using quarterly data and
HAC (Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) standard errors, we nd
that our regions can be classied into two groups from the point of view of price
convergence. The core group (or Subgroup A) consists of Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto,
Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki and Chugoku regions. Their t value is greater than -1.65 and
thus there is evidence of convergence among them. Further analysis suggests that
there is evidence of no divergence among the rest of the regions (Subgroup B) since
the t value is again above the critical value. Interestingly, three regions in Subgroup
B are geographically contiguous. Our ndings of convergence in sub-groups are also
conrmed by the estimated values of Ht (Figure 3) which decrease over time.
<Table 8 and Figure 3>
This result is generally consistent with that from annual data. In this case,
the composition of Subgroup A is slightly di¤erent from that for quarterly data,
and some regions (Tohoku, Tokai, Kinki and Chugoku) now belong to Subgroup B.
But there is a tendency for regions in the group to be geographically adjacent, and
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again Japanese regions can be classied into two groups: the t value for checking
convergence in the other regions (Subgroup B) is above the critical value.
These results imply a similarity in price behaviors among geographically close
regions, and furthermore suggest that the potential importance of the mark-up in
the distribution sector (Baba 2008) and of heterogeneous wages and transaction
costs (Nagayasu and Inakura 2009). The heterogeneity in wages among regions can
in turn be explained by low labor mobility as Nagayasu and Inakura show that less
2 percent of population move to other prefectures within a one year interval for
reasons related to work. Thus despite conventional expectations, the regions cannot
be characterized as open economies even within the same country.
We thus extend our analysis to seek reasons for the heterogeneity in price levels.
One potential explanation is already hinted at in Table 6 where we nd a strong
relationship between ination and income growth. Thus, we utilize income data
again, but unlike our study in Table 6, this time they are region-specic and in
levels.18 Furthermore, income (fgniit) is expressed per capita using population data.
In the panel data context, their relationship can be expressed as equation (9) with
xed (i) and time (t) e¤ects.
pit = i + t + i(fgniit) + eit (9)
Although our data here are region-specic and di¤er from those used earlier,
it may be more appropriate to allow for di¤erent income elasticities for regions.
Thus we rst estimate this equation (without t) using the Dynamic Seemingly
Unrelated Cointegrating Regression (DSURE) method (Mark, Ogaki and Sul 2005).
This method allows us to estimate heterogeneous parameters among regions for
simultaneous estimation of multiple cointegrating regressions,19 and furthermore
the DSURE estimators are robust to an endogeneity bias due to the introduction
of lagged and lead variables. In order to check the feasibility of the homogeneous
parameters, the poolability test is also carried out using the Hauseman type test
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(Phillips and Sul 2003) after obtaining heterogeneous parameters.
Table 9 summarizes the results and shows that income is positively and sig-
nicantly associated with price. This is consistent with Nagayasu and Inakura
(2009) who analyzed the relationship between the relative price (pit pt ) and income
(gniit  gnit ), where the asterisk indicates the variables of a benchmark prefecture.
However, no evidence of homogeneity in estimators is obtained by the Hausman
type test. Thus, we implement based on equation (9) panel cointegration tests (Pe-
droni 1999) which allow heterogeneity in adjustment coe¢ cients and parameters.
The Pedroni test results are also reported in Table 9 and conrm the presence of
cointegration between these data using panel cointegration tests.20 Thus, while the
scope of this exercise is limited due to the availability of region-specic data, re-
gional income goes some way toward explaining the creation of subgroups in Japan.
Furthermore, since we utilize a comprehensive data set (i.e., CPI), our result is not
inconsistent with Esaka (2003) who shows the tendency of stationarity of relative
prices in the tradable goods sector and nonstationarity in the non-tradable sector.
<Table 9>
5 Conclusion and Discussion
Many people believe that regions already in a monetary union experience harmonized
ination. This paper asks if this conventional belief is appropriate using the regional
data of a country which has had her own monetary union with her own currency
and central bank for a long period of time.
In particular, our main interest is in Japan with its relatively homogenous culture
and people. Although national boundaries have modied slightly in the past, it has
formed a monetary union with a single central bank of over 100 years standing.
Therefore, having a uniform level of regional ination would be the conventional
belief of policymakers and academics.
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Our ndings are in sharp contrast to this belief and are threefold. First, we pro-
vide evidence of regional ination as statistically di¤erent among regions in Japan
using the conventional statistical signicance level. In contrast, our data do not
show signicant diversity among regional ination in the UK and US (see Appen-
dix). Second, using the factor model, this paper identied the common factor driven
by monetary and economic activities, and then found that ination responds to the
common shock di¤erently among regions. Finally, no evidence of price convergence
is obtained in our group consisting of all regions although there seems to be con-
vergence among subgroups. Discrepancies in regional income seem to go some way
toward explaining those in regional ination.
Please note that this paper is not meant to propose abandoning the ination/price
criterion when considering the formation of monetary union. But our results show
that even a country with heterogeneous ination can maintain monetary union and
thus make us rethink the importance of homogeneous prices and/or ination (or
more generally convergence criteria) when forming a monetary union. One poten-
tial source of successful monetary union in Japan is intergovernmental scal transfers
which function as a redistribution of nancial wealth. Indeed, Japan has a tightly
controlled transfer mechanism from central to local governments although the power
of central government has been declining over the past decades. In this regard,
Mochida (2001) provides one intriguing example: Tokyo which is a rich prefecture
collected Y196,000 per capita worth of prefectural tax revenues in FY1993, while
Okinawa managed only Y60,000, the lowest gure among prefectures. However, af-
ter taking into account intergovernmental scal transfers, the general revenues (per
capita) of Okinawa jumped to Y213,000, exceeding that of Tokyo (Y206,000). This
level of intergovernmental transfers cannot be observed in other advanced countries.
Thus, our ndings suggest that countries and regions which lack such an intergov-
ernmental scal transfer system may need to consider more seriously ination/price
heterogeneity.
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Notes
1With respect to the ination criterion, it cannot be higher than 1.5% of the
average ination rate of the three countries with the lowest individual rates.
2Mundell (1961) is probably the most cited work on the optimum currency area.
Generally, there are ve principal criteria for a successful currency area: labor mo-
bility across regions, product diversication, openness with capital mobility, price
and wage exibility across the region, and an automatic scal transfer mechanism
for redistribution of money among regions.
3The isolated location of the country was an important factor preventing inward
and outward population mobility. But tight immigration laws have been a more
relevant explanation in recent years.
4There are many similar studies conducted for other countries. See for example
Engel and Rogers (1996), Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2002), Rogers (2007) and
Nath and Sarkar (2009) for the US, Beck, Hubrich and Marcellino (2009), Rogers
(2007) andWolszczak-Derlacz (2008) for European countries, Massidda andMattana
(2008) for Italy, and Das and Bhattacharya (2008) for India.
5Apart from these factors, Faber and Stokman (2009) revealed that indirect tax
rates and input costs are important economic explanations for heterogeneous price
levels in Europe.
6Tohoku consists of 6 prefectures (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata and
Fukushima), Kanto of 9 prefectures (Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba,
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Yamanashi and Nagano), Hokuriku of 4 prefectures (Niigata,
Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui), Tokai of 4 prefectures (Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi and
Mie), Kinki of 6 prefectures (Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara and Wakayama),
Chugoku of 5 prefectures (Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima and Yamaguchi),
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Shikoku of 4 prefectures (Tokushima, Kanagawa, Ehime and Kochi), and Kyushu of
7 prefectures (Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki and Kagoshima).
Hokkaido and Okinawa regions contain only Hokkaido and Okinawa prefectures re-
spectively. This classication method is based on that of the Ministry of Internal
A¤airs and Communications.
7Obviously there may be other variables which could be considered to inuence
ination, but we use the minimum set of variables for computational ease.
8Okinawa was one of the prefectures/regions most severely a¤ected during World
War II. It was returned to Japan by the US in 1972, and in order to catch up with
other prefectures, the government has set up dedicated o¢ ces. In the Cabinet O¢ ce,
there are sections (e.g., Okinawa Shinkokyoku) in charge of economic development in
Okinawa, which exist only for Okinawa. See Takagi, Shintani and Okamoto (2004)
for the introduction of the yen in Okinawa in 1972.
9Regional ination is analyzed and some explanations for discrepancies in regional
ination have recently been provided for Europe. For example, Beck, Hubrich and
Marcelliono (2009) pointed out, using six euro area countries, that regional ination
di¤erentials are related to non-wage input factors and di¤erences in the economic
structure of the regions.
10Although our US data show evidence of homogenous ination, Phillips and
Sul (2007) report no evidnece of price convergence in a group consisting of all
regions/cities. This seemingly inconsistent result with ours may be attributable
to di¤erent sample periods used in the analyses. Phillips and Sul used a much
longer sample (1918-2001) which contains a period of less integratation among re-
gions/cities.
11Our choice of one common factor is consistent with the number predicted by the
statistical approach. For example, Bai and Ng (2002) proposed several information
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criteria to estimate the true number of common factors in the static factor model.
According to their criteria, there seem to be one to three common factors in our
panel data. Given that these criteria tend to overestimate the true number in small
panel data, our choice of one common factor seems reasonable.
12The t-value is 4.10 (=0.041/0.010) for M1 and is 10.47 (=0.178/0.017) for M2.
13The results are generally not sensitive to the denition of money.
14There is another concept of convergence known as -convergence. In this frame-
work, convergence takes places when the price dispersion across regions declines over
time. It is known that -convergence is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for
-convergence.
15Using equation (5), the standard convergence model can be written as Xit  
Xjt = (it   jt)t where t is a common factor. The problem with the standard
panel unit root test arises when the convergence speed of it and jt to  is slower
than the divergence speed of t. In this case, Xit   Xjt may retain nonstationary
characteristics even though the convergence condition, it and jt !  as t ! 1,
holds.
16The concept of convergence requires at least two regions.
17Estimations in this section are based on Suls computer programs.
18Data are also transformed from annual to quarterly data using the cubic-match-
last method.
19The lag order of three is used for the analysis.
20While not shown here, these data are found to be nonstationary using the unit
root test.
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Appendix
This appendix shows results from annual data which correspond to Tables 1 and
2, and shows that the heterogeneity in Japanese regional ination is one unique
feature since no evidence of such heterogeneity is observed in the UK and US. Here
we use CPI data for the US obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics with
coverage of 19 regions from 1965 to 2008, but some regions are dropped to create
a balanced panel data set. The British authorities do not compile regional price
data, and therefore we utilize annual data constructed by Hayes (2005) which covers
11 regions for the period of 1974-1996. As a result, annual data are used for all
countries.
Tables A1 and A2 correspond to Tables 1 and 2 based on quarterly data. Table
A2 shows that there are signicant discrepancies in regional ination only in Japan.
Table A1. Basic Statistics of Regional Ination (Annual Data)
Mean Std Min Max 95% Conf.
Japan Dev Interval
Hokkaido 1.855 2.654 -1.094 8.843 0.912 2.797
Tohoku 2.106 2.769 -0.687 9.464 1.116 3.096
Kanto 2.063 2.619 -0.890 9.003 1.131 2.995
Hokuriku 2.044 2.615 -0.995 8.883 1.114 2.973
Tokai 2.025 2.511 -0.792 9.074 1.150 2.901
Kinki 2.014 2.525 -1.083 9.027 1.108 2.919
Chugoku 2.022 2.697 -0.891 8.910 1.080 2.964
Shikoku 1.928 2.556 -0.792 9.212 1.016 2.839
Kyushu 2.019 2.644 -1.080 8.910 1.058 2.979
Okinawa 1.675 2.308 -0.892 7.792 0.822 2.529
UK
East Anglia 7.838 5.354 -0.640 20.864 5.593 10.084
East Midlands 7.867 5.261 0.331 21.026 5.680 10.054
North 7.755 5.337 -0.257 21.026 5.658 9.851
North West 7.788 5.110 0.889 19.721 5.536 10.039
South East 7.860 5.220 0.522 20.212 5.899 9.821
South West 7.802 5.410 -0.489 21.026 5.314 10.291
West Midlands 7.793 5.128 -0.298 20.457 6.027 9.559
Yorkshire & Humberside 7.840 5.167 0.611 20.945 5.471 10.208
N Ireland 7.665 5.290 0.261 21.511 5.593 9.738
Scotland 7.785 5.133 0.079 21.188 5.730 9.840
Wales 7.761 5.208 -0.240 21.188 5.826 9.696
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Table A1. Continued.
Mean Std Min Max 95% Conf.
US Dev Interval
Boston-Brockton-Nashua 4.542 2.467 1.300 12.081 3.907 5.178
NY-Northern NJ-Long Island 4.532 2.194 1.546 10.794 3.888 5.176
Phila.-Wilmington-Atlantic City 4.403 2.524 1.016 12.333 3.669 5.136
Pittsburgh 4.369 2.707 0.866 12.896 3.666 5.072
Atlanta 4.324 2.750 1.129 13.016 3.553 5.095
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha 4.353 2.719 1.270 13.527 3.521 5.186
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint 4.335 2.795 1.395 14.753 3.492 5.177
Cleveland-Akron 4.415 2.996 0.231 14.135 3.496 5.334
Cincinnati-Hamilton 4.306 2.799 0.658 12.711 3.458 5.155
Milwaukee-Racine 4.316 2.967 0.373 13.952 3.407 5.224
Minneapolis-St. Paul 4.434 2.838 1.300 11.595 3.559 5.309
Dallas-Fort Worth 4.370 3.052 1.341 15.640 3.527 5.214
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria 4.256 3.153 -0.958 12.444 3.312 5.201
LA-Riverside-Orange County 4.454 2.788 1.322 14.641 3.720 5.189
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 4.542 2.879 0.816 14.138 3.746 5.337
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton 4.531 3.044 1.036 15.254 3.565 5.498
Anchorage 3.839 2.814 0.369 12.879 3.037 4.640
Honolulu 4.354 2.721 -0.233 11.073 3.458 5.249
Portland-Salem 4.369 2.939 0.765 12.724 3.596 5.142
Note: The sample period is 1975-2005 for Japan, 1974-1996 for the UK and
1965-2008 for the US. The Bootstrap method is used to calculate the condence
interval based on 1,000 replications.
Table A2. Basic Statistical Tests for Di¤erences in Regional Ination (Annual
Data)
Country Mean Test (p-value)
Japan F[9,20] =2.580(0.0375)
UK F[10,12] =0.230 (0.9865)
US F[18,26] =1.740 (0.0970)
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Tables
Table 1. Basic Statistics of Regional Ination (Annual Changes)
Obs Mean Std Min Max
Dev
Hokkaido 120 1.770 2.839 -1.590 9.919
Tohoku 120 2.014 2.815 -1.079 10.643
Kanto 120 1.962 2.638 -1.378 9.849
Hokuriku 120 1.984 2.621 -1.701 9.385
Tokai 120 1.930 2.553 -1.370 9.768
Kinki 120 1.915 2.547 -1.763 9.736
Chugoku 120 1.922 2.711 -1.367 10.257
Shikoku 120 1.850 2.553 -1.093 9.839
Kyushu 120 1.930 2.673 -1.487 10.414
Okinawa 120 1.594 2.315 -1.186 8.477
Note: The sample period is from 1975Q4-2005Q4.
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Regional Ination
Hokk Toho Kant Hoku Toka Kink Chug Shik Kyus Okin
Hokkaido 1.000
Tohoku 0.925 1.000
Kanto 0.902 0.985 1.000
Hokuriku 0.896 0.980 0.985 1.000
Tokai 0.909 0.988 0.990 0.981 1.000
Kinki 0.895 0.980 0.992 0.980 0.989 1.000
Chugoku 0.898 0.986 0.984 0.979 0.988 0.984 1.000
Shikoku 0.907 0.987 0.984 0.981 0.987 0.983 0.988 1.000
Kyushu 0.906 0.984 0.991 0.979 0.982 0.983 0.990 0.991 1.000
Okinawa 0.851 0.940 0.971 0.952 0.944 0.947 0.948 0.947 0.954 1.000
Note: The sample period is from 1975Q4-2005Q4. Hokkaido (Hokk), Tohoku
(Toho), Kanto (Kant), Hokuriku (Hoku), Tokai (Toka), Kinki (Kink), Chugoku
(Chug), Shikoku (Shik), Kyushu (Kyus), and Okinawa (Okin)
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Table 3. Basic Statistical Tests for Di¤erences in Regional Ination
Region Mean Test (p-value)
All 10 F[9,111] = 4.610 (0.000)
Excl. Okinawa F[8,112] = 2.910 (0.006)
Table 4. Unspecied Common Factors in the Factor Model
Region Explanatory variable Coef Std Err P -value
Hokkaido f 3.124 0.228 0.000
Tohoku f 3.433 0.224 0.000
Kanto f 3.266 0.213 0.000
Hokuriku f 3.253 0.213 0.000
Tokai f 3.179 0.207 0.000
Kinki f 3.162 0.206 0.000
Chugoku f 3.299 0.215 0.000
Shikoku f 3.130 0.204 0.000
Kyushu f 3.271 0.213 0.000
Okinawa f 2.717 0.186 0.000
V(Hokkaido) 1.366 0.178 0.000
V(Tohoku) 0.127 0.019 0.000
V(Kanto) 0.086 0.014 0.000
V(Hokuriku) 0.170 0.024 0.000
V(Tokai) 0.078 0.012 0.000
V(Kinki) 0.102 0.015 0.000
V(Chugoku) 0.104 0.016 0.000
V(Shikoku) 0.086 0.013 0.000
V(Kyushu) 0.109 0.016 0.000
V(Okinawa) 0.474 0.062 0.000
Test
Wald Chi2(10)= 239.43  0.000
Equality of f(Chi2(9))= 88.06  0.000
Log likelihood= -997.635  
Note: V refers to variance of v in equation (1). The Wald test examines the null
hypothesis of all parameters for f being statistically zero, and the Chi2 test analyzes
if they are identical.
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Table 5. The Factor Model (Money)
Endogenous variables Coef Std Err P-value Coef Std Err P-value
f m1 0.041 0.010 0.000
m2 0.178 0.017 0.000
Hokkaido (p) f 2.828 0.209 0.000 1.866 0.138 0.000
Tohoku (p) f 3.121 0.205 0.000 2.060 0.135 0.000
Kanto (p) f 2.952 0.193 0.000 1.948 0.128 0.000
Hokuriku (p) f 2.956 0.195 0.000 1.951 0.129 0.000
Tokai (p) f 2.881 0.188 0.000 1.901 0.125 0.000
Kinki (p) f 2.855 0.187 0.000 1.884 0.124 0.000
Chugoku (p) f 3.010 0.197 0.000 1.987 0.130 0.000
Shikoku (p) f 2.824 0.185 0.000 1.864 0.122 0.000
Kyushu (p) f 2.973 0.195 0.000 1.962 0.129 0.000
Okinawa (p) f 2.446 0.169 0.000 1.615 0.112 0.000
V(Hokkaido) 1.379 0.180 0.000 1.380 0.181 0.000
V(Tohoku) 0.126 0.018 0.000 0.127 0.019 0.000
V(Kanto) 0.087 0.014 0.000 0.085 0.013 0.000
V(Hokuriku) 0.171 0.024 0.000 0.170 0.024 0.000
V(Tokai) 0.079 0.012 0.000 0.079 0.012 0.000
V(Kinki) 0.101 0.015 0.000 0.100 0.015 0.000
V(Chugoku) 0.093 0.014 0.000 0.094 0.014 0.000
V(Shikoku) 0.081 0.013 0.000 0.082 0.013 0.000
V(Kyushu) 0.106 0.016 0.000 0.107 0.016 0.000
V(Okinawa) 0.472 0.062 0.000 0.471 0.062 0.000
Test
Wald Chi2(13)= 313.970  0.000 1026.970  0.000
Equality of f (Chi2(9))= 93.160  0.000 92.660  0.000
Log likelihood= -968.775   -919.450  
Note: V refers to variance of v in equation (1). The Wald test examines the null
hypothesis of all parameters for fand money (m1 or m2) being statistically zero,
and the Chi2 test analyzes if the parameters for f are identical across regions.
28
Table 6. The Factor Model
(Money, Income and Call Rate/Japanese Government Bonds Rate)
Endogenous variables Coef Std Err P-value Coef Std Err P-value
f m2 0.240 0.028 0.000 0.238 0.027 0.000
gni -0.140 0.051 0.006 -0.137 0.051 0.008
call 0.068 0.051 0.182
jgb 0.118 0.088 0.180
Hokkaido (p) f 1.797 0.133 0.000 1.797 0.133 0.000
Tohoku (p) f 1.984 0.130 0.000 1.983 0.130 0.000
Kanto (p) f 1.876 0.123 0.000 1.876 0.123 0.000
Hokuriku (p) f 1.879 0.124 0.000 1.879 0.124 0.000
Tokai (p) f 1.831 0.120 0.000 1.831 0.120 0.000
Kinki (p) f 1.815 0.119 0.000 1.814 0.119 0.000
Chugoku (p) f 1.913 0.125 0.000 1.913 0.125 0.000
Shikoku (p) f 1.795 0.118 0.000 1.795 0.118 0.000
Kyushu (p) f 1.890 0.124 0.000 1.889 0.124 0.000
Okinawa (p) f 1.555 0.108 0.000 1.555 0.108 0.000
V(Hokkaido) 1.380 0.180 0.000 1.379 0.180 0.000
V(Tohoku) 0.127 0.019 0.000 0.126 0.019 0.000
V(Kanto) 0.086 0.014 0.000 0.086 0.013 0.000
V(Hokuriku) 0.170 0.024 0.000 0.170 0.024 0.000
V(Tokai) 0.079 0.012 0.000 0.079 0.012 0.000
V(Kinki) 0.101 0.015 0.000 0.101 0.015 0.000
V(Chugoku) 0.094 0.014 0.000 0.094 0.014 0.000
V(Shikoku) 0.081 0.013 0.000 0.081 0.013 0.000
V(Kyushu) 0.107 0.016 0.000 0.107 0.016 0.000
V(Okinawa) 0.471 0.062 0.000 0.471 0.062 0.000
Test
Wald Chi2(13)= 1125.520  0.000 1125.820  0.000
Equality of f (Chi2(9))= 92.790  0.000 92.790  0.000
Log likelihood= -914.975   -914.965  
Note: V refers to variance of v in equation (1). The Wald test examines the
null hypothesis of all parameters for f , money (m1 or m2), gni, and call/jgb being
statistically zero, and the Chi2 test analyzes if the parameters for f are identical
across regions.
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Table 7. Regional Di¤erence Index of Consumer Prices (2005)
Region Index
Hokkaido 102.6
Tohoku 98.5
Kanto 102.9
Hokuriku 100.7
Tokai 99.8
Kinki 101.4
Chugoku 98.7
Shikoku 96.7
Kyushu 96.8
Okinawa 95.2
Note: Country average =100.
Source: Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications.
Table 8. Convergence in Regional Prices
Groups b t values t values for checking
convergence in the rest
Quarterly data
Subgroup A (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, 0.253 0.821 -0.255
Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku)
Subgroup B (Shikoku, Kyushu, Okinawa)   
Annual data
Subgroup A (Hokkaido, Kanto, Hokuriku) -0.075 -0.255 0.821
Subgroup B (Tohoku, Tokai, Kinki,   
Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, Okinawa)
Note: Sample period: 1975-2005.
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Table 9. Dynamic SURE (DSURE) and Panel Cointegration Tests
DSURE Estimation Parameter Std Err
Hokkaido 0.282 0.065
Tohoku 0.234 0.038
Kanto 0.283 0.025
Hokuriku 0.325 0.031
Tokai 0.231 0.030
Kinki 0.239 0.043
Chugoku 0.248 0.036
Shikoku 0.314 0.064
Kyushu 0.299 0.049
Okinawa 0.314 0.039
Homogeneity test Chi2 P-value
38.840 0.000
Panel cointegration test Stat
Group rho -3.287
Group pp -3.454
Group adf -1.762
Note: Income elasticity is calculated for each region by the Dynamic Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (DSURE) method (Mark, Ogaki and Sul 2005), and the poola-
bility test is conducted by the Hausman type test (Phillips and Sul 2003). Panel
cointegration tests are based on Pedroni (1999) which takes account of the time ef-
fect and allows for heterogeneous parameters for each region. The statistics for the
cointegration tests are distributed as the standard normal, and thus the 5% critical
value is -1.65.
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Idiosyncratic Components in Regional Inflation 
 
Note: The cross-section average inflation is removed from regional inflation. 
 
Figure 2. Japanese Regional Prices 
 
Note: The data are constructed on the basis of the differences in regional inflation in 2005. 
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Figure 3. Transition 
Subgroup A 
 
SubgroupB 
 
Note: The figure is based on our calculation of Ht in equation (7) using quarterly data. 
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